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Launched in July 2013 by the European Union and the United States, the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) represents an important effort 
to reach a comprehensive economic agreement between two major trading partners. 
As has been pointed out, the project offers great opportunities for liberalizing trade 
and investment and regulatory convergence.1 Its level of ambition implies high risks, 
but despite negotiators’ initial optimism, its success is far from certain.   
This Perspective focuses on the project’s investment chapter, drawing lessons from 
the failed negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which was 
meant to consolidate the results of liberalization in the OECD area, establish new 
disciplines and introduce protection and dispute settlement.  
As the TTIP’s starting basis on investment bears a strong resemblance to the MAI, an 
analysis of the achievements and pitfalls of those earlier negotiations can provide 
useful insights. Both the TTIP and the MAI cover the pre- and post-establishment 
investment phases. The highest standards of treatment are envisaged in the TTIP, 
enforced by an effective investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. 
On the positive side, the draft MAI reflected state-of-the-art provisions on the 
treatment of investors and investments, drawn mostly from such previous agreements 
as NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty, as well as bilateral investment treaties 
concluded by OECD members. It also included protections for host countries, such as 
the right to regulate, environmental and social safeguards and responsible investor 
conduct. Negotiators expressly protected the regulatory sovereignty of the 
participating countries by providing that the MAI “would not inhibit the normal non-
discriminatory exercise of regulatory powers by governments and such exercise of 
regulatory powers would not amount to expropriation.”2 
MAI negotiators also agreed on the following to reflect societal interests: 
• in the preamble, a strong reference to sustainable development, internationally 
recognized core labor standards and environmental protection; 
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• a prohibition on lowering health, safety, environmental, or labor standards to 
attract investment; 
• annexing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which provide 
expectations of governments relating to the regulation of multinational 
enterprises. 
At a minimum, these elements should be reflected in the TTIP’s investment chapter. 
On the negative side, the following unresolved issues contributed to the demise of the 
MAI: 
• the absence of a clear concept of investment to be covered by the agreement 
and the broad definition of "investor" (for both liberalization and protection);  
• general exceptions, sector-specific exceptions and carve-outs were left open 
until the very last stage of the negotiations; 
• permitting extensive use of investor-state arbitration. 
Moreover, negotiators underestimated the political dimension of the exercise and did 
not reach out to stakeholders—parliamentarians, NGOs, opinion makers—until it was 
too late to communicate a positive image of the MAI. 
How can such pitfalls be avoided in the TTIP? 
There is a need for a clear-cut definition of FDI for purposes of liberalization along 
the lines of the agreed OECD/IMF definition. Open-ended concepts that include non-
FDI forms of investment should be precluded, and the definition of “investor” should 
require the identification of ultimate beneficial ownership and control. 
TTIP negotiators should seek an early understanding of how far parties are prepared 
to go in the area of liberalization, how any exceptions should be framed and whether 
carve-outs for any sectors or categories of measures should be permitted. Pushing 
these issues to the last stage of negotiations could be a road to disaster. 
Although some commentators doubt that investment-protection provisions are best 
placed in trade and investment liberalization agreements,3 there is a definite trend in 
favor of the comprehensive approach taken by the TTIP and previous FTAs.  
ISDS proved to be a major source of controversy in the MAI. Can the TTIP do better 
in achieving political acceptability? While some contentious issues, such as 
arbitrators’ conflicts of interest, consistency of outcomes, transparency, and cost, can 
be addressed, the fundamental issue of legitimacy remains. Is there value in 
privatizing justice for the sole benefit of foreign investors when treaty partners have 
well-developed legal systems and independent judiciaries? There is a trade-off 
between substance and procedure. As the MAI experience has shown, parties are 
inclined to request sweeping exceptions or carve-outs when ISDS is involved. 
European negotiators should also be mindful that legal integration is a key feature for 
the Union and that the European Court of Justice should make ultimate decisions on 
the interpretation of European law. 
Further consideration should be given to domestic political processes. Setting a tight 
deadline for the conclusion of the deal would be counterproductive. Key issues like 
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ISDS should be discussed in an open forum, and leaving room for an enlightened and 
comprehensive debate with a wide range of stakeholders would be beneficial to the 
success of the negotiations.4 
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